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ABSTRACT 
Previous experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences 
in the voluntary provision of public goods.  A number of competing models of 
such preferences have been proposed.  We provide evidence for one model of 
behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional cooperation).  
Consistent with previous research, we find that participants in the voluntary 
contribution mechanism attempt to match the contributions of others in their 
group.  We also examine participants in a related game with different equilibria, 
the weakest-link mechanism.   Here, in contrast, participants contribute so as 
to match the minimum contribution of others in their group. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A recent spate of theories has emerged to explain pro-social preferences 
as observed in experiments and in real life (see Sobel, 2001 for an outstanding 
review).  This paper focuses on one category of these preferences—reciprocal or 
matching preferences.  We present experimental results testing the existence 
and forms of these preferences from two public goods environments, the well-
known linear public goods game (Voluntary Contribution Mechanism or VCM) 
and the relatively under-studied weakest link mechanism (WLM). 
In the VCM, the amount of public good produced depends on the total of 
individual contributions.  Both theoretically and experimentally, this 
mechanism generates relatively low efficiency.  In the WLM, the amount of 
public good produced depends on the minimum of all contributions.1 It gives rise 
to multiple equilibria, one of which is perfectly efficient.  Experimentally, the 
WLM promotes efficiency in sequential environments (as in Camerer, Weber and 
Knez, 2003), but the results are far less solid in simultaneous settings (van 
Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1991). 
Note that whereas the VCM has a unique, dominant strategy equilibrium, 
WLM has a continuum of pure strategy, Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria (when 
the action space is continuous, and has a multiplicity of equilibria when it is 
discrete).  In this paper we examine the decision-making processes in the two 
institutions.  First, we find deviations from equilibrium predictions in both 
institutions. Second, we find evidence for reciprocity (or matching) as an 
explanation for that deviation in both institutions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the two 
games and their experimental implementation. Section 3 reports the 
experimental results and Section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1The WLM was introduced by Hirshleifer (1983). Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) conceptualize the 
WLM as a kind of veto power over the extent of collective achievement and it has been proposed as 
a useful approach to real life coordination problems, from disasters (like floods) to assembly lines. 
II. THE EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT 
II.1. The voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) 
In economic experiments, the most common public goods institution is the 
VCM (see Ledyard, 1995 or Keser, 2002 for a review). In our experiment, N=4 
subjects are endowed with ei=50 Cents and are asked to simultaneously and 
privately allocate this endowment between a public and a private account. The 
payoff of each individual i is determined by the sum of his allocation to the 
private account and half of the group’s total allocation to the public account. In 
the stage game, player i has a dominant strategy to free ride for any given 
allocation of her three partners.  This game is typically repeated finitely many 
times, leading to a Nash equilibrium outcome of full free-riding.  Yet, this 
outcome is socially inefficient.   
  
II.2. The weakest link mechanism (WLM) 
The setting in the WLM is the same; groups of size four, and each 
individual has 50 cents to allocate between the two accounts.  However, in the 
WLM, participants earn the sum of their allocations to the private account and 
twice the group’s minimum allocation to the public account.  In the stage game, 
there are multiple Nash equilibria which coincide with the set of all symmetric 
strategy profiles.  Since participants are limited to allocate in whole pennies, 
and each has 50 cents to allocate, there are fifty-one symmetric, Pareto-ranked 
equilibria.2  Complete allocation of all endowments to the public account is the 
Pareto-efficient equilibrium.  Any unit allocated to the public account in excess 
of the minimum is socially inefficient. 
 
II.3. The experimental procedure 
In this paper we report the results of computerized experiments, which 
replicate closely the environment, particularly the information and payoff 
                                                 
2In the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the zero contribution equilibrium is risk dominant 
while the one in which every player contributes his entire endowment is Pareto-dominant. 
structure, of Croson’s (2000) VCM with individual information.3 The experiments 
involved 24 economics undergraduates in each treatment, organized into groups 
of four from a room of twelve. None of the participants had previously 
participated in a public goods experiment.   
The experiments entailed ten periods of the VCM (or the WLM), with 
another ten-period surprise restart game.4 Participants were randomly chosen 
to form groups of four in the first period and remained together throughout both 
the original and the restart game. Instructions were written in neutral 
language, referring to allocations of tokens rather than contributions.  Before 
the experiment, participants completed a quiz to ensure that they understood 
the payoffs involved in the experiment, and there was a post-experimental 
survey to elicit participants’ thoughts about the experience.  Instructions, quiz 
and surveys are available from the authors. 
After each round, participants were told the individual contributions of 
the other three members of their group in increasing order of contribution; 
individual contributions were not identified with their contributor such that it 
was impossible to trace individual contributions (as in Croson 2000). 
Additionally, subjects were informed about their own earnings both in total and 
subdivided by private and public accounts.  Average earnings of a subject were 
€10.43 in the WLM experiments, and €13.06 in the VCM. Experiments took less 
than an hour to run. 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
III.1.  Average Contributions 
Figure 1 shows the average contributions to the public good in each of the two 
environments over the 20 rounds.  
  
                                                 
3Urs Fischbacher’s z-tree was used for the computer programme. 
(Figure 1 around here) 
 
 Replicating previous studies, we find behavior that is significantly 
different than that predicted by equilibrium analysis.  Allocations to the public 
good in the VCM are significantly different than zero, starting at around 40% of 
endowment and then declining over the length of the game. Allocations in the 
WLM are also not at equilibrium; in 118 out of the 120 periods (20 periods for 
each group times six groups), the individuals in the groups allocated different 
amounts to the public good. 
We also observe contributions decreasing over the ten-periods in the 
game, consistent with previous experiments.  A regression of group 
contributions on period number and including an indicator variable for each 
group and for the restart game produces a significantly negative coefficient for 
both the VCM  
(b = -6.381, p=.0000) and the WLM (b = -3.594, p=.0000). 
Finally, these data replicate the restart effect, observed by Andreoni (1988) 
and Croson (1996) in VCM experiments. We observe a restart effect in both 
environments.  If we treat each group of four as an independent observation, a 
Wilcoxon test compares contributions in round 10 [the last round of the original 
game] and round 11 (the first round of the restart game).  These differences are 
significant for the VCM, p=.028 and for the WLM, p=.046.  Thus, we conclude 
that participants significantly increase their contributions when the game 
restarts. 
 
III.2. Conditional cooperation 
But the focus of our paper is on identifying the decision rules in these 
environments.  A number of competing models have been proposed to explain 
results like those found above.  One set of those models involve reciprocity (also 
                                                                                                                                                         
4The restart technique has been investigated in repeated public goods experiments (see, e.g., 
Andreoni (1988), Croson (1996, 2002), Andreoni and Croson [forthcoming] provide a review). 
called matching, also called conditional cooperation).5  In these models, 
participants try to match the allocations of their counterparts.  Thus if others 
contribute to the public good you want to contribute, while if others free-ride 
you want to keep your endowment for your private consumption.   
We follow Croson (1998) in analyzing the allocations to test this 
explanation.  The regressions are run separately for the original game and the 
restart game.  The dependent measure is individual i’s contribution to the 
public good in period t.  Independent variables include the period t, indicator 
variables for each individual and, of most interest, a measure of what an 
individual’s counterparts did last period. 
For the VCM, we use the average allocation to the public good of the other 
three members of your group in the previous period as this measure.  Croson 
(1998) showed that this average is salient to the participants and related to 
their own allocations.  For the WLM we use the minimum allocation to the 
public good of the other three members in your group in the previous period as 
this measure. Note that this is not necessarily the amount of the public good 
that is provided (the participant’s own allocation may have been less than those 
of his three counterparts).  But we believe that this measure is salient to the 
participants in the WLM.6  The regressions are run using random effects 
regression.7  Thus the equations are:  
 
Model VCM: itiitcont eabbb ++++= -- tAverCont it 2110  
                                                 
5See, e.g., Sugden (1984), Andreoni (1995), Palfrey and Prisbey (1997), Croson (1998), Sonnemans et 
al. (1999), Fischbacher et al. (2001), Keser and van Winden (2000), and Brandts and Schram (2001). 
6We have also run a number of additional specifications including using the middle of the other 
three contributions instead of the average, including the min and the max in the VCM regression, 
and the average, the middle and the max in the WLM regressions.  All have similar results as those 
described here: individuals’ contributions are positively related to the previous contributions of 
others, and support our contention that in the VCM participants focus on the average contributions 
and in the WLM participants focus on the minimum contribution. 
7This approach has been used, for instance, in Croson (1998). The random variables aki of the model 
account for idiosyncratic behavior and are uncorrelated to the white noise error terms ekit for each 
subject i and in period t. For further reading see Greene (2000).  
Model WL: itiitcont eabbb ++++= -- tMinCont it 2110  
24,...,2,1="i  and "t = {2,3,..,10} 
 
where contit-1 is i‘s lagged contribution, [AverCont-it-1] denotes the lagged average 
contributions of i‘s partners in the previous period, and [MinCont-it-1) denotes the 
lagged minimum contribution of i’s partners, t is the period number and ai are 
the individual indicator variables..  The results are presented in Table 1. 
 
(Table 1 around here) 
 
 As can be seen in Table 1, the coefficients on the measure of others’ 
allocations are positive and significant in both environments and for both the 
original and the restart game.  This lends support to the reciprocity or matching 
explanations suggested to explain our results.   
 We can also do this analysis at the individual level.  For each individual, 
we calculate the correlation between their allocations to the public good and 
their counterparts’ lagged measure (average or minimum) over the 20 periods.  
Of the 48 individuals in our experiment, 45 of them have positive correlations 
between their own allocations to the public good and the appropriate measure of 
their counterparts’ allocations.  This is significantly different than what would 
have occurred by chance; a binomial test of the null hypotheses that half these 
correlations are positive and half are negative is soundly rejected (p<.0001). 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Our data replicate previous results from the voluntary contribution 
mechanism, and point out similarities between the patterns of allocations to the 
public good there and in the weakest link mechanism.  In both games, initial 
allocations average around 40%, decline over the length of the game, and 
restart significantly when the game is restarted.  Equilibrium play is hardly 
ever observed. 
We provide evidence for one model behavior in these games, reciprocity 
(or matching, or conditional cooperation).  Consistent with Croson (1998), we 
find that participants in the VCM attempt to match the contributions of others 
in their group.  Subjects in the WLM, in contrast, attempt to match the 
minimum contribution of others in their group.  
This evidence suggests some directions that theories developing to 
explain cooperative behavior like that observed here might take.  Focusing on 
the impact of social comparisons, the other players’ actions and individuals’ 
desires to conform to them are likely to be useful paths to follow. 
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Figure 1: Average Allocations to the Public Good 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Random Effects Regression Results (SE) 
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Weakest Link Mechanism 
 Original  Restart  Original  Restart  
Constant 15.113** 
(3.330) 
15.508** 
(4.084) 
Constant 9.873** 
(1.737) 
10.665** 
(0.758) 
Avg Contt-1 0.402** 
(0.118) 
0.415** 
(0.150) 
Min Contt-1 0.478** 
(0.102) 
0.225** 
(0.070) 
Period -1.062** 
(0.283) 
-1.319** 
(0.331) 
Period -0.350^ 
(0.209) 
-0.303** 
(0.074) 
Individual 
Dummies 
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Yes 
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Yes 
      
R2 0.6339 0.5299 R2 0.4496 0.8667 
^ p < .10 
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